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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the long-run dynamics of the market selec-
tion process among simple trading strategies in an incomplete asset
market with endogenous prices. We identify a unique surviving finan-
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1
1 Introduction
In their seminal paper Blume and Easley (1992) studied the market selection
mechanism in an asset market model with endogenous prices. Investors follow
simple trading strategies (i.e. the proportion of wealth invested in each asset
is fixed over time) and reinvest their payoffs in each period. The market
equilibrium process enforces a redistribution of market wealth among the
traders. Blume and Easley (1992) showed that in a market in which securities
have diagonal payoffs (i.e. in each state exactly one asset has a non-zero
payoff1) the unique survivor of the market selection process is “betting your
beliefs.” That is those investors who divide income proportionally to the
probabilities of the states have the highest growth rate of wealth in any
population of simple trading strategies and will therefore accumulate the
total market wealth in the long run.
With exogenous prices (fixed to one for every asset) this remarkable prop-
erty of the ”betting your beliefs”–rule has been known ever since Breiman
(1961). This rule can be generated by maximizing the expected logarithm of
relative returns which in turn is known as the Kelly rule, (Kelly 1956).
In this paper we extend the above model to asset markets with incomplete
payoff structure. We show that, in any incomplete market without redundant
assets, there is a unique surviving financial trading strategy which asymptot-
ically gathers total market wealth. According to this trading strategy, one
should divide income proportionally to the expected relative returns of the
assets. In the case of diagonal securities, this means “betting one’s beliefs.”
The results presented in this paper bring the portfolio theory of Blume
and Easley (1992) (which is based on market selection) closer to a possible
application. Indeed the new strategy is very easy to implement. Assuming
ergodicity of the returns a large enough sample of past returns is a good esti-
mator of expected returns and in order to form the best surviving portfolio,
nothing more needs to be known about the assets.
Our paper also contributes to the problem of log-optimum investment
policies in which trading strategies with maximum expected (exponential)
growth rate are searched for. This maximum growth perspective is explored
e.g. by Algoet and Cover (1988), Aurell, Baviera, Hammarlid, Serva, and
Vulpiani (1998), Browne and Whitt (1996), Cover (1991), Hakansson (1970),
Hakansson and Ziemba (1995), Karatzas and Shreve (1998), Thorp (1971),
1An example are Arrow securities.
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among others. In this approach the price process is treated as exogenous,
which is common practice in mathematical finance. However, from an equi-
librium point of view this assumption is not satisfactory because it ignores
any equilibrium consequences. In our model we calculate the market-clearing
price in every period based on the existing trading strategies and the associ-
ated market wealth of investors. Thus the price-mechanism plays a central
role in the market selection process here. In this view our model endogenizes
prices in the above-mentioned approach. The possibility of “evolutionary
spite,” which transmits through prices, no longer favors investors maximiz-
ing the expected logarithm of pay-offs when markets are incomplete.
For recent results in the case of endogenous savings and non-simple trad-
ing strategies see Blume and Easley (2000) and Sandroni (2000). These
papers show that in the case of complete markets among all infinite horizon
expected utility maximizers those who happen to have rational expectations
will eventually dominate the market. This interesting result holds irrespec-
tively of the investors’ risk aversion characteristics. The intuition goes that
differences in investors expectations determine their savings rates which are
essential for the growth of the investors’ wealth.
Finally let us remark that the result of this paper is complementary to
that of Hens and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2001) who show that the trading strategy
mentioned above is the unique locally stable trading strategy for general
ergodic states of the world.
Section 2 introduces the model, and Section 3 presents the main result of
this paper. The proof of the auxiliary results are given in the Appendix.
2 The Investment Model
Except for the more general asset structure, we use the same model as in
Blume and Easley (1992). Time t = 1, 2, . . . is discrete, and uncertainty is
modeled by a sequence s1, s2, ... of independent identically distributed ran-
dom variables (states of the world), taking values in a finite space S. In
every period, the states are drawn according to the probability distribution
p = (ps)s∈S, ps > 0. We denote by P the product measure of p constructed
on the space of sample paths (st)t=1,2,.... Further E denotes the expectation
with respect to the measure P .
There are i = 1, . . . , I investors initially endowed with wealth wi0 > 0.
Assets k = 1, . . . , K live for one period only but are identically reborn
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in every period. They yield the non-negative return Ak(s) at state s, and
we assume that Ak(s) "= 0 for at least one s. Moreover, we assume that∑
k Ak(s) > 0 for all s.
At each time t, every investor i selects a portfolio
θit(s
t) = (θi1,t(s
t), . . . , θiK,t(s
t)) ∈ RK+
based on the observation of the history st = (s1, ..., st).
Let ρk,t(st) be the price of asset k in period t given history st. Then we
can define the agent’s budget shares as
λik,t(s
t) =
ρk,t(st)θik,t(s
t)
wit(st)
where wit(s
t) is the investor’s wealth, i.e.,
wit(s
t) =
K∑
k=1
Ak(st)θ
i
k,t−1(s
t−1).
For each i, we call the sequence of budget shares (λik,t(s
t))t=1,2,... a trading
strategy of investor i. A completely mixed trading strategy assigns a positive
percentage of wealth λik,t(s
t) to every asset k = 1, . . . , K for all t and st (and
so wit(s
t) > 0 for all t, st). Following Blume and Easley (1992), we focus
on trading strategies that are completely mixed and, moreover, simple: the
budget shares λik,t(s
t) = λik > 0 are supposed to be constant, i.e. independent
of t and st.
The investor’s budget restriction is
K∑
k=1
ρk,t(s
t)θik,t(s
t) = wit(s
t)
in any period in time t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Hence every λi = (λi1, ...,λ
i
K) is in the
unit simplex ∆K = {a ∈ RK+ |
∑
k ak = 1}.
By our assumptions on the returns of the assets, the wealth of any com-
pletely mixed trading strategy always remains positive. This does not mean,
however, that every completely mixed trading strategy will survive, i.e. will
have a positive wealth almost surely also in the limit for t → ∞. It will
be proved later on that, among such strategies, there will be a single sur-
vivor. Note also that in the definition of next period wealth we have assumed
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that no investor saves or withdraws any money along the process. Our re-
sults carry over to the case of saving rates which are constant over time and
identical among investors.
Define aggregate wealth in state s at period t by wt(st) =
∑
i w
i
t(s
t).
Then market shares are given by rit(s
t) = wit(s
t)/wt(st) and we can de-
fine normalized prices by qk,t(st) = ρk,t(st)/wt(st). The relative payoffs are
Rkt (s
t) = Ak(st)/wt(st). This allows to write the investor’s next period rela-
tive wealth equivalently as
rit+1(s
t+1) =
K∑
k=1
Rkt+1(s
t+1)
λik r
i
t(s
t)
qk,t(st)
.
In this model, we assume that the supply of every asset is exogenously
given. Without loss of generality, by appropriate choice of the returns, we
can safely assume that assets are in fixed supply of one unit each. Hence
equilibrium of supply and demand requires that
I∑
i=1
θik,t(s
t) = 1 for all t, k, and st.
Note that equilibrium implies wt(st) =
∑K
k=1 Ak(st), and so we can write
wt(st) = w(st), i.e., the aggregate wealth is a function of the current state
st rather than of the whole history st and, moreover, this function does
not explicitly depend on t. Similarly, Rkt (s
t) = Rk(st), and, furthermore,∑K
k=1 Rk(st) = 1. Moreover, the normalized prices are determined by the
market shares according to
qk,t(s
t) =
I∑
i=1
λik r
i
t(s
t).
This finishes the description of the model. In the next section we analyze
the evolution of market shares.
3 A Global Stability Result
According to the above model, the market selection process is given by the
following random dynamical system, describing the evolution of the market
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shares:
rit+1(s
t+1) =
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1)
λikr
i
t(s
t)∑I
i=1 λ
i
kr
i
t(st)
, i = 1, 2, ..., I. (1)
We say that an investor i (or the strategy λi used by i) is a single survivor
if, for any strictly positive initial vector r0, we have rit → 1 almost surely
(a.s.) and λjt → 0 a.s. when j "= i. Denote by ei the vector in RI , whose
coordinates are equal to 0 except for the ith coordinate which is equal to 1.
If investor i is a single survivor, then all the random paths (1) are attracted
to ei a.s., regardless of the initial state. In this sense, ei is a globally stable
fixed point of the random dynamical system under consideration. The main
result – Theorem 1 below – indicates a strategy λ∗ ∈ ∆I such that, under
quite general assumptions, the following assertion holds: if investor i uses the
strategy λ∗, whereas all the other investors use different strategies, λj "= λ∗,
then i is a single survivor.
Define
Rk = ERk(st)
[
=
∑
s∈S
psRk(s)
]
.
Set λ∗ = (λ∗k), where
λ∗k = Rk, k = 1, ..., K,
and assume that Rk > 0 for each k. Suppose there are no redundant as-
sets in the market, i.e., the functions R1(s), ..., RK(s) of s ∈ S are linearly
independent then we can state the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Let investor i use the strategy λi = λ∗, while all the other in-
vestors j "= i use strategies λj "= λ∗. Then investor i is the single survivor.
This theorem is valid for any strictly positive vector of initial wealth r0,
which yields the global stability of the state ei, as mentioned above.
Note that the assumption of non-existence of redundant assets is essen-
tial. This assumption can be fulfilled only if the number of elements in S
is not less than K. Thus it cannot hold in the deterministic case – when
S consists of a single point. In the latter case, it is easy to construct an
example when the investor i using the strategy λ∗ is not a single survivor.
Indeed, suppose i = 1 and the strategy λ1 = λ∗ is representable in the form
λ∗ =
∑I
j=2 bjλ
j , where b = (bj) ∈ ∆I−1, bj > 0. Then, for any κ ∈ (0, 1), we
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can represent λ∗ as
∑I
j=1 ajλ
j, where a1 = 1− κ and aj = κbj, j ≥ 2. In the
deterministic case, the values Rk(s) = λ∗k do not depend on s, and we can
see from (1) that the vector r = (aj) ∈ ∆I is a fixed point of the dynamical
system in question for each κ ∈ (0, 1). This leads to the failure of (global as
well as local) stability of the point e1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof proceeds in several steps. We also employ
an auxiliary result whose proof is relegated to the Appendix.
1st step. Without loss of generality, we may assume that i = 1 and hence
λ1k = λ
∗
k. Define
qk,t(s
t) =
I∑
m=1
λmk r
m
t (s
t), ζk,t(s
t) =
∑I
i=2 λ
i
k r
i
t(s
t)
1− r1t (st)
By using (1), we can write (omitting the arguments st and st+1)
1− r1t+1
1− r1t
=
∑I
i=2 r
i
t+1
1− r1t
=
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1)
(1− r1t )−1
∑I
i=2 λ
i
kr
i
t
qk,t
=
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1)
ζk,t
qk,t
Observe that
K∑
k=1
ζk,t =
∑I
i=2
∑K
k=1 λ
i
kr
i
t
1− r1t
=
1− r1t
1− r1t
= 1
and
qk,t =
I∑
m=1
λmk r
m
t = λ
1
k r
1
t + (1− r1t )
∑I
i=2 λ
i
k r
i
t
1− r1t
= λ1k r
1
t + ζk,t (1− r1t ).
Consequently,
1− r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1)
ζk,t (1− r1t )
λ1k r
1
t + ζk,t (1− r1t )
(2)
while
r1t+1 =
K∑
k=1
Rk(st+1)
λ1k r
1
t
λ1k r
1
t + ζk,t (1− r1t )
(3)
The above considerations may be regarded as a reduction of the original,
I-dimensional, dynamical system to another system, which is, on the one
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hand, only 2-dimensional, but on the other hand, deals with a process of a
more general kind (more general, because ζk,t depends on t and st).
2nd step. For each t = 1, 2, ..., consider the random variable
Dt = ln
r1t /r
1
t−1
(1− r1t )/(1− r1t−1)
We have
D1 + ... + DT = ln
r1T
1− r1T
− ln r
1
0
1− r10
Therefore, in order to prove that the investor 1 is a single survivor, it is
sufficient to show that
lim
T→∞
1
T
(D1 + ... + DT ) > 0, a.s.
From (1), we find
H−1 ≤ r
i
t+1
rit
≤ H, for all i = 1, ..., I.
where H = (maxi,k λki )(mini,k λ
i
k)
−1. This implies
H−1 ≤ 1− r
1
t+1
1− r1t
≤ H
because 1 − r1t =
∑I
m=2 r
m
t . Consequently, the random variables Dt are
uniformly bounded.
We have the following identity
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
Dt+1 =
1
2T
(D1 + DT ) +
1
2T
T−1∑
t=1
(Dt + Dt+1).
Since the random variables DT are uniformly bounded, it suffices to show
that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Gt > 0, a.s.
where Gt = Dt + Dt+1. For each t ≥ 1, denote by E(· | st) the operator
of conditional expectation given st. Let us write, formally, E(· | s0) for the
unconditional expectation E(·). Then we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
Gt =
1
T
T∑
t=1
E(Gt | st−1) + 1
T
T∑
t=1
[Gt − E(Gt | st−1)].
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In view of the uniform boundedness of Gt, we can apply to the process of
martingale differences Bt := Gt−E(Gt|st−1) the strong law of large numbers,
see e.g. Hall and Heyde (1980, Theorem 2.19), which yields T−1(B1 + ...
+BT ) → 0 a.s. The proof will be completed if we show that, for some
strictly positive constant δ,
E[Gt|st−1] ≥ δ, a.s. for all t = 1, 2, ....
3rd step. We have
E[Gt |st−1] = E[(Dt+1 + Dt) | st−1]
= E
[
ln
r1t+1/r
1
t
(1−r1t+1)/(1−r1t )
|st−1
]
+ E
[
ln
r1t /r
1
t−1
(1−r1t )/(1−r1t−1)
|st−1
]
By using (2), (3) and the assumption of independence of the random variables
st, we find
E[Gt|st−1] =
∑
σ,s
pσ ps ln
∑
k Rk(σ)
λ1k
λ1k r
1
t (s) + ζk,t(s) (1− r1t (s))∑
k Rk(σ)
ζk,t(s)
λ1k r
1
t (s) + ζk,t(s) (1− r1t (s))
(4)
+
∑
s
ps ln
∑
k Rk(s)
λ1k
λ1k r
1
t−1 + ζk,t−1 (1− r1t−1)∑
k Rk(s)
ζk,t−1
λ1k r
1
t−1 + ζk,t−1 (1− r1t−1)
(5)
where
ζk,t(s) =
∑I
i=2 λ
i
k r
i
t(s)
1− r1t (s)
> 0, ζk,t−1 =
∑I
i=2 λ
i
k r
i
t−1
1− r1t−1
> 0, (6)
rit(s) =
K∑
k=1
Rk(s)
λik r
i
t−1∑I
m=1 λ
m
k r
m
t−1
, rit−1 = r
i
t−1(s
t−1). (7)
In the above formulas, we assume that st−1 is fixed and denote, for shortness,
the value of rit−1(s
t−1) at the point st−1 by rit−1. Observe that r
i
t(s) coincides
with rit(s
t−1, s) = rit(s1, ..., st−1, s). If t = 1, then r
i
t−1(s
t−1) := ri0.
4th step. We will employ the following lemma (its proof is given in the
Appendix).
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Lemma 1 For any µ = (µk) ∈ ∆K with µ > 0 and any κ ∈ [0, 1], we have
E ln
K∑
k=1
Rk(s)
λ∗k
λ∗k κ+ µk (1− κ)
− E ln
K∑
k=1
Rk(s)
µk
λ∗k κ+ µk (1− κ)
≥ 0. (8)
Furthermore, if λ∗ "= µ, then the difference on the left-hand side of (8) is
strictly positive.
Here, Eg(s) =
∑
s psg(s) for any function g on S. We write µ > 0 if
all the coordinates of the vector µ are strictly positive. Recall that we have
assumed λ∗ > 0.
Let us prove that the expression in (5) is bounded away from 0 by a
strictly positive constant. Let us regard this expression as a function Φ(r)
of the vector r = rt−1, where r ranges over ∆I+ := { r ∈ ∆I : r > 0} (the
numbers ζk,t−1, ζk,t(s) and rit(s) are expressed through r
i = rit−1 by formulas
(6) and (7)). By virtue of Lemma 1, Φ(r) ≥ 0, r ∈ ∆I . It suffices to show
that inf∆I+ Φ(r) > 0.
Let us perform the following change of variables
θ = 1− r1, and γm = r
m
1− r1 for m = 2, ..., I. (9)
Thus r1 = 1 − θ and rm = θγm. When r ranges over ∆I+, the vector
(θ, γ2, ..., γI) runs through the set (0, 1) × ∆I−1+ . Writing formulas (6) and
(7) in terms of the new variables, we obtain
ζk,t−1 =
∑I
i=2 λ
i
kθγ
i
θ
=
I∑
i=2
λikγ
i, (10)
r1t (s) =
K∑
j=1
Rj(s)
λ1j(1− θ)
λ1j(1− θ) + θζj,t−1
, (11)
rit(s) =
K∑
j=1
Rj(s)
λijθγ
i
λ1j(1− θ) + θζj,t−1
, i = 2, ..., I (12)
ζk,t(s) =
∑I
i=2 λ
i
kr
i
t(s)
1− r1t (s)
=
K∑
j=1
Rj(s)
∑I
i=2 λ
i
kλ
i
jγ
i
λ1j(1− θ) + θζj,t−1
K∑
j=1
Rj(s)
ζj,t−1
λ1j(1− θ) + θζj,t−1
(13)
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Let us consider the function Ψ(θ, γ) of θ ∈ [0, 1] and γ = (γ2, ..., γI) ∈
∆I−1 defined by the formula
∑
σ,s
pσps ln
∑
k
Rk(σ)λ1k
λ1kr
1
t (s) + ζk,t(s)(1− r1t (s))∑
k
Rk(σ)ζk,t(s)
λ1kr
1
t (s) + ζk,t(s)(1− r1t (s))
+
∑
s
ps ln
∑
k
Rk(s)λ1k
λ1k(1− θ) + ζk,t−1θ∑
k
Rk(s)ζk,t−1
λ1k(1− θ) + ζk,t−1θ
where ζk,t−1, rit(s), and ζk,t(s) are given by equations (10)–(13). For every
r ∈ ∆I+, there is an element (θ, γ) ∈ (0, 1)×∆I−1+ ⊂ [0, 1]×∆I−1, as defined
by (9), such that Φ(r) = Ψ(θ, γ), and so
inf
r∈∆I+
Φ(r) ≥ inf
(θ,γ)∈[0,1]×∆I−1
Ψ(θ, γ).
Thus it suffices to show that the last infimum is strictly positive.
5th step. The values of the functions ζk,t−1 = ζk,t−1(γ) and ζk,t(s) =
ζk,t(s, θ, γ) are not less than (minλij)
3 > 0 (see (10) and (13)). Consequently,
the function Ψ(θ, γ) is continuous on the compact set [0, 1] × ∆I−1, and in
order to show that it is bounded away from 0 it suffices to show that it is
strictly positive. Suppose Ψ(θ, γ) is zero for some (θ, γ). Then∑
s
ps ln
∑
k Rk(s)λ
1
k (λ
1
k (1− θ) + ζk,t−1 θ)−1∑
k Rk(s) ζk,t−1 (λ
1
k (1− θ) + ζk,t−1 θ)−1
= 0 (14)
and ∑
σ
pσ ln
∑
k Rk(σ)λ
1
k (λ
1
k r
1
t (s) + ζk,t(s) (1− r1t (s)))−1∑
k Rk(σ) ζk,t(s) (λ
1
k r
1
t (s) + ζk,t(s) (1− r1t (s)))−1
= 0, (15)
for all s ∈ S, since, by virtue of Lemma 1, the above sums are non-negative.
The former of these two equations implies
λ1k = ζk,t−1, for all k = 1, ..., K (16)
and the latter gives
λ1k = ζk,t(s) =
K∑
j=1
Rj(s)
∑I
i=2 λ
i
k λ
i
j γ
i
λ1j (1− θ) + ζj,t−1 θ
=
K∑
j=1
(Rj(s)
λ∗j
I∑
i=2
λik λ
i
j γ
i
)
(17)
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for all s ∈ S and k = 1, ..., K. Indeed, if (16) fails to hold, then, in view of
Lemma 1, we have a strict inequality in (14). Analogously, (15) implies (17).
6th step. Let us show that relations (16) and (17) cannot hold simulta-
neously. This will lead to a contradiction and thus prove the theorem. Since
λ1k = λ
∗
k, we obtain from (10) and (16)
λ∗k = ζk,t−1 =
I∑
m=2
λmk γ
m, k = 1, ..., K (18)
By using this formula and (17), we find
K∑
j=1
Rj(s)pi
k
j = 0, s ∈ S, k = 1, ..., K,
where
pikj =
1
λ∗j
I∑
m=2
λmk λ
m
j γ
m −
I∑
m=2
λmk γ
m.
Since there are no redundant assets, we have pikj = 0 for each j and k. This
yields
I∑
m=2
λmk (λ
m
j − λ∗j) γm = 0, for all k, j = 1, ..., K.
By adding up these equalities over k and setting k = j in the foregoing
formula, we find
I∑
m=2
(λmj − λ∗j) γm = 0, and
I∑
m=2
λmj (λ
m
j − λ∗j) γm = 0, j = 1, ..., K.
By combining these equations, we get
I∑
m=2
(λmj − λ∗j)2 γm = 0, j = 1, ..., K.
Since
∑
γm = 1, we have γm > 0 for some m ∈ {2, ..., I}. Then λmj = λ∗j ,
j = 1, ..., K. This means that some investor m ∈ {2, ..., I} uses the strategy
(λ∗1, ...,λ
∗
K). We have obtained a contradiction. !
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4 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, if µ = λ∗, inequality (8) turns into an equality.
Let us show that the expression on the left-hand side of (8) – denote it by
Ξ(µ,κ) – is strictly positive for all κ ∈ [0, 1] and µ "= λ∗. By applying Jensen’s
inequality, we find
E ln
K∑
k=1
Rk(s)
λ∗k
λ∗k κ+ (1− κ)µk
≥
K∑
k=1
λ∗k ln
λ∗k
λ∗k κ+ (1− κ)µk
, (19)
E ln
K∑
k=1
Rk(s)
µk
λ∗k κ+ (1− κ)µk
≤ lnE
K∑
k=1
Rk(s)
µk
λ∗k κ+ (1− κ)µk
(20)
and so
Ξ(κ, µ) ≥
K∑
k=1
ak ln
ak
ak κ+ (1− κ)µk − ln
K∑
k=1
ak
µk
ak κ+ (1− κ)µk (21)
where ak = λ∗k.
Let κ = 0. Then the right-hand side of (21) reduces to∑
ak ln ak −
∑
ak lnµk.
This difference is strictly positive, since (ak) "= (µk).
If κ ∈ (0, 1], then we have a strict inequality in (20). To prove this it
suffices to show that the function
φ(s) =
K∑
k=1
Rk(s)µk[λ
∗
kκ+ (1− κ)µk]−1, s ∈ S,
is not a constant. Suppose φ(s) is constant, i.e. φ(s) ≡ γ. Then
K∑
k=1
Rk(s)
(
µk [λ
∗
k κ+ (1− κ)µk]−1 − γ
)
= 0, s ∈ S,
which implies µk = γ (λ∗k κ + (1 − κ)µk), since the functions Rk(·), k =
1, 2, ..., K, are linearly independent. We can see that γ = 1, and so κ (λ∗k −
µk) = 0. Since κ > 0, this implies λ∗k = µk, k = 1, 2, ..., K, which, however,
is ruled out by our assumptions.
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It remains to prove that the expression on the right-hand side of (21) is
non-negative. It is equal to zero if κ = 1. If κ < 1, we can write it in the
form
g(u) =
K∑
k=1
ak ln
ak
aku + µk
− ln
K∑
k=1
ak
µk
aku + µk
, (22)
where u = κ(1−κ)−1. We can see that g(u)→ 0 as u→∞. Thus it remains
to prove the inequality g′(u) ≤ 0 for all u > 0. We write
g′(u) = −
K∑
k=1
a2k (ak u + µk)
−1 +
∑K
k=1 a
2
k µk (ak u + µk)
−2∑K
k=1 ak µk (ak u + µk)
−1 .
The sign of g′(u) is the same as the sign of the expression
J := −
[ K∑
k=1
a2k (ak u+µk)
−1
] K∑
k=1
ak µk (ak u+µk)
−1+
K∑
k=1
a2k µk (ak u+µk)
−2.
By setting wk = ak u + µk, we find µk = wk − ak u and
J = −
[ K∑
k=1
a2k w
−1
k
] K∑
k=1
ak (wk − ak u)w−1k +
K∑
k=1
a2k (wk − ak u)w−2k
= −
[ K∑
k=1
a2k w
−1
k
] [
1−
K∑
k=1
a2k uw
−1
k
]
+
K∑
k=1
a2k w
−1
k −
K∑
k=1
a3k uw
−2
k
= u
[( K∑
k=1
ak vk
)2 − K∑
k=1
ak v
2
k
]
,
where vk = akw
−1
k . The last expression is non-positive by virtue of the
Schwartz inequality.
The lemma is proved. !
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